I have a question on China-related things in your Foreign Affairs piece. You say that China's traditional posture, with "a handful of unfueled ICBMs" and warheads stored separately "enabled a retaliation-only strategy, accompanied by a “no first use” pledge to the world." Fair enough. But why the new posture, with "hundreds of new ICBM silos," would be any different in that regard? It can much better support the "retaliation-only strategy" and is perfectly compatible with the NFU pledge. What has changed? Other than US ability to credibly threaten to deny China the capability to retaliate, of course. But from China's point of view, it's perfectly reasonable to preserve this capability and one can easily imagine that that's exactly the argument for the ICBM expansion - to deny the US the coercive power, not to acquire this power for China. Couple it with US missile defense, and this arguments becomes even stronger. This goes to the question raised by Bob Gallucci, which you didn't really answer - you cannot ignore the fact that certain US policies have consequences. The "modest adjustments" that you suggest will definitely trigger a response (however misguided). In the end, the damage limitation capability that you value will be simply unattainable.
I have a question on China-related things in your Foreign Affairs piece. You say that China's traditional posture, with "a handful of unfueled ICBMs" and warheads stored separately "enabled a retaliation-only strategy, accompanied by a “no first use” pledge to the world." Fair enough. But why the new posture, with "hundreds of new ICBM silos," would be any different in that regard? It can much better support the "retaliation-only strategy" and is perfectly compatible with the NFU pledge. What has changed? Other than US ability to credibly threaten to deny China the capability to retaliate, of course. But from China's point of view, it's perfectly reasonable to preserve this capability and one can easily imagine that that's exactly the argument for the ICBM expansion - to deny the US the coercive power, not to acquire this power for China. Couple it with US missile defense, and this arguments becomes even stronger. This goes to the question raised by Bob Gallucci, which you didn't really answer - you cannot ignore the fact that certain US policies have consequences. The "modest adjustments" that you suggest will definitely trigger a response (however misguided). In the end, the damage limitation capability that you value will be simply unattainable.
Pavel Podvig