We talk to Bob Peters and John Warden about a future U.S. nuclear force posture, how arms control can help manage a tough period of time for modernization, and meet John's dog.
Very grateful for this informative look into how the prevailing winds are pointing on this crucial issue.
Unfortunately, what I'm hearing is quite dispiriting. The assumption that damage limitation is a key goal, and essential to extended deterrence, isn't even treated as something that calls for supporting argument. This is pretty disturbing. The idea that meaningful damage limitation would be possible in the fog of a nuclear war doesn't pass the basic smell test of common sense, or the basic arithmetic of how many targets would have to be destroyed in how brief a time.
This doesn't mean that counterforce attacks can't be an instrument of deterrence. Indeed, any sane person should agree that they're more credible than countervalue targeting, they stand some chance of keeping a nuclear war limited, and they also have the important advantage of obeying the law of armed conflict. US deterrence should absolutely rest on counterforce targeting.
But as plenty of people have pointed out, counterforce attacks cannot achieve the mission of damage limitation against an adversary like Russia or 21st Century China. Trying to achieve that mission will simply risk an unstable three-way arms race. It sounds as if such an arms race lies in our near future. I'm very sad to hear it.
Very grateful for this informative look into how the prevailing winds are pointing on this crucial issue.
Unfortunately, what I'm hearing is quite dispiriting. The assumption that damage limitation is a key goal, and essential to extended deterrence, isn't even treated as something that calls for supporting argument. This is pretty disturbing. The idea that meaningful damage limitation would be possible in the fog of a nuclear war doesn't pass the basic smell test of common sense, or the basic arithmetic of how many targets would have to be destroyed in how brief a time.
This doesn't mean that counterforce attacks can't be an instrument of deterrence. Indeed, any sane person should agree that they're more credible than countervalue targeting, they stand some chance of keeping a nuclear war limited, and they also have the important advantage of obeying the law of armed conflict. US deterrence should absolutely rest on counterforce targeting.
But as plenty of people have pointed out, counterforce attacks cannot achieve the mission of damage limitation against an adversary like Russia or 21st Century China. Trying to achieve that mission will simply risk an unstable three-way arms race. It sounds as if such an arms race lies in our near future. I'm very sad to hear it.