A very interesting treatment of this issue which I’m sure is going to gather more attention in the months ahead. However, the claim that “nuclear deterrence has been at the core of NATO’s mutual security guarantee and collective defence since 1949” is historically misleading. At NATO’s founding, only the U.S. possessed nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union tested its first device later that year, the UK not until 1952, and France only in 1960—despite strong U.S. opposition.
NATO’s formation was rooted more in conventional military considerations than nuclear ones. As Lord Ismay famously summarized, the Alliance’s goal was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” The primary threat was perceived to be a Soviet armored offensive through Central Europe, and NATO’s European conventional forces were always seen as weaker in both quality and quantity compared to the Warsaw Pact.
U.S. nuclear forces were positioned in Europe, but American threat assessments often exaggerated Soviet capabilities to pressure allies into higher defense spending—largely to purchase American weapons. Notably, France has always maintained an independent deterrent and has never relied on the so-called American “nuclear umbrella.” The UK, after several failed delivery systems (e.g., Blue Steel, Blue Streak), became dependent on U.S. technology, ultimately adopting Polaris and now Trident SLBMs. Today, the UK’s nuclear posture is so tightly integrated with the U.S. that it no longer constitutes an independent European deterrent in any meaningful sense—unlike France’s force de frappe.
A very interesting treatment of this issue which I’m sure is going to gather more attention in the months ahead. However, the claim that “nuclear deterrence has been at the core of NATO’s mutual security guarantee and collective defence since 1949” is historically misleading. At NATO’s founding, only the U.S. possessed nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union tested its first device later that year, the UK not until 1952, and France only in 1960—despite strong U.S. opposition.
NATO’s formation was rooted more in conventional military considerations than nuclear ones. As Lord Ismay famously summarized, the Alliance’s goal was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” The primary threat was perceived to be a Soviet armored offensive through Central Europe, and NATO’s European conventional forces were always seen as weaker in both quality and quantity compared to the Warsaw Pact.
U.S. nuclear forces were positioned in Europe, but American threat assessments often exaggerated Soviet capabilities to pressure allies into higher defense spending—largely to purchase American weapons. Notably, France has always maintained an independent deterrent and has never relied on the so-called American “nuclear umbrella.” The UK, after several failed delivery systems (e.g., Blue Steel, Blue Streak), became dependent on U.S. technology, ultimately adopting Polaris and now Trident SLBMs. Today, the UK’s nuclear posture is so tightly integrated with the U.S. that it no longer constitutes an independent European deterrent in any meaningful sense—unlike France’s force de frappe.
For a deeper dive into this subject, I invite readers to check out Ariadne’s latest dispatch on Substack: https://ariadnesdispatches.substack.com/p/why-nato-needs-ukraine?r=4ijqvu&utm_medium=ios.