Think Small: Arms Control in the Interim...

Earlier this week we had a great conversation lamenting the end of the New START Treaty, but I left wishing we’d had more time to talk about the arms control period that we’re now entering into. I’m sharing a few additional points on this topic here, maybe for future discussion and hopefully for feedback from the broader community.

First point: The agenda laid out by Under Secretary DiNanno in his Geneva speech is ambitious. He points to a next era of arms control, the output of which will be verifiable, broad in scope, enforceable, and multilateral. In the ways we discussed on the pod, DiNanno is correct when he says that this will be neither quick nor easy.

My conclusion is that we face a potentially lengthy gap between where we are today and the conclusion of this ambitious new multilateral effort. It’s both important and interesting to think about what happens in arms control during that gap. I’d argue the answer can’t be “nothing,” and we need solutions that both increase U.S. and international security and help put us on the right course for the treaty DiNanno previewed. Consistent with that mindset are reports suggesting a “responsible” approach to U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear engagement during the next period, although details on this approach remain far from clear. However, given the concern DiNanno and others have expressed about the importance of bringing China into the arms control conversation, the interim approach must also include China.

Given Beijing’s allergy to participation in arms control, where to start? I think the design of an interim approach should address three objectives: 1) providing real security benefits to the United States, and, presumably, other participants; 2) helping to set the stage for the more ambitious program DiNanno laid out for the longer term; and 3) demonstrating to NPT non-nuclear weapon states that we are serious about our Article VI obligations, not setting an impossibly high standard for arms control to continue.

There’s been a lot said and written about the approach to New START’s arsenal limits in this next phase; I think it’s at least as interesting to consider what New START’s other, non-limit provisions suggest for what we might want to do in this period, in parallel with the ambitious program laid out in Geneva. For instance:

1. Transparency: New START data exchanges stopped in 2023, and the State Department has since reported last January that the lack of these data (and other important verification tools) leave us unable to say with confidence whether Russia is currently within New START limits. As others have said, it would be useful to resume some form of voluntary data exchange with Russia, but with New START’s expiration there is no reason (beyond convenience, which I don’t discount!) that voluntary exchanges need to look identical to what was provided for under New START. We should analyze what particular aspects of Russia’s nuclear numbers, locations, or movements (whether provided under New START or not) we would find most valuable to exchange, while also considering what data would be most likely and useful as an entry point for Chinese participation.

The April NPT Review Conference is an immediate opportunity on this topic, as nuclear weapon state transparency will assuredly be a major theme of discussion. This is the chance for NPT non-nuclear weapon states to bring their leverage to bear, making clear that Article VI progress cannot wait until DiNanno’s announcement is realized, but also that action and transparency from all of the nuclear weapon states is needed. The United States has traditionally led the pack on transparency; it should lean into that, holding China to a higher standard, rather than holding ourselves to a lower one. The P5 should take this issue up in earnest between now and the end of the RevCon in order to have something positive to say. A written P5 product laying out thoughtfully the contours of the transparency we see as useful would be a massively positive contribution to the RevCon; absent that, a U.S. or P3 paper would also have value.

2. Inspections: While voluntary transparency is easy to imagine, inspections seem much harder to me without a legal structure in place. Maybe some level of comfort could be possible carrying out visits under a different agreement that provides relevant privileges and immunities, for example, but I’d be very nervous sending inspectors into Russia even with the protections of New START, and it’s hard to imagine any Chinese interest in this.

A baby step in this direction could be on the education side. A big chunk of New START and its predecessors focused on the administrative and procedural elements of inspections, much of which has less to do with the substance of the inspection and more to do with trivia like who provides meals and the role of embassy staff and air crews. It would be interesting (at least to me!) to explore how much of that is generalizable to any future arms control agreement, and how different it would need to look in a multilateral case. The P5 have received New START briefings before – while the administrivia of hosting inspections might not be the sexiest topic to take up in that venue, it could offer opportunity to explore with China (and the UK and France) some elements of what a future agreement will have to grapple with; without committing to any specific arrangement, this kind of work could have the benefit of implicitly endorsing a future role for all of the P5, most pointedly China, in future arms control efforts. More concrete than briefings would be demonstrations. Again, announcements in this area would redound well in the NPT.

3. Testing: As we discussed at length in the pod, the role of nuclear tests in all this is extremely interesting, and might open up a door in the above areas. DiNanno not only laid out U.S. accusations of Chinese activities counter to its moratorium on explosive nuclear testing, but also indicated that restoring “responsible behavior when it comes to nuclear testing” would be part of the new U.S. arms control efforts. I don’t know what the administration has in mind, but ideas along the lines we discussed on the pod involving mutual verification of our respective voluntary nuclear testing moratoria, whether through information or equipment or inspectors, seem like a great near-term step towards implementing the administration’s vision. In a 2023 speech, then NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby announced efforts to expanding transparency into activities at the former U.S. test site, providing live-streaming and radiation detection equipment as examples. NNSA followed up with in-person transparency at the site here and here. With last week’s announcement, dusting off the ideas floated by Hruby could provide a toolkit through which to verify the U.S. accusations against China. If at the same time these efforts can begin building greater Chinese familiarity and comfort with the presence of equipment or people in sensitive locations, so much the better for the future arms control treaties we now seek.

4. Other Constraints: New START had other provisions that are worth contemplating for what comes next. In her interview with Pranay, Rose Gottemoeller mentioned New START’s prohibition on interference with national technical means of verification. The treaty also precludes joint basing of heavy bombers for nuclear and non-nuclear arms. These kinds of commitments could be made voluntarily and multilaterally (recognizing the ambiguity as to what we’d be using NTM to verify in the absence of New START’s legal obligations…). Lacking new START’s Bilateral Consultative Commission, commitments to consult in the event of perceived risk of nuclear war, or maybe just when questions arise about activities observed by one nuclear weapon state in another, could be considered. Beyond New START, what constraints on basing of dual-capable strategic systems like Oreshnik would we welcome? I’d argue in favor of sifting through New START and other measures and considering which elements could be snapped up in a joint statement in some configuration.

Even these kinds of measures would be neither easy nor quick, but certainly they would be easier and quicker than a trilateral treaty setting limits on nuclear arsenals. Informed by Pranay’s interesting interviews over the past month, I think this kind of measure would have three near-term benefits:

1. (Partially) replace some of the non-limit provisions lost with New START’s expiration, with security benefits for the United States (and for Russia!)

2. (Potentially) expand the arms control conversation to include China, helping to build some familiarity in Beijing with the concepts we want to bring them into in the longer term

3. (Definitely) demonstrate seriousness with regard to fulfilling NPT obligations under Article VI, with nonproliferation benefits.

More generally, my point is that, while endorsing the U.S. arms control objective announced by U/S DiNanno and wishing the U.S. team luck in implementing it, I think they should also pursue smaller measures in the near term that point us in the right direction. There are many other examples (e.g. these good ones put forth by Joseph Rodgers and Doreen Horschig at CSIS, and touched on by others in the excellent compilation of expiration reactions in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists). The narrative today is that Russia offered to extend an arms control treaty and the United States refused, insisting on a next step with China that is known to be a very tall order. Bringing to the P5 and NPT parties a more modest, parallel approach for the interim would regain the initiative, and put China and Russia on the hook to respond. Whatever the first step, we should think small and get started!