We welcome Matthew Sharp, a new senior fellow at the MIT Center for Nuclear Security Policy, to his first Pod and an obscure debate over four shibboleths (or principles) of nuclear strategy.
Hi guys, thanks for a great discussion. I thought the questioning of baseline premises and assumptions was incredibly useful and thought-provoking, and I wanted to ask a couple of follow-ups:
First, in addition to revisiting terminology, I’d be interested to hear your expanded thoughts on methodology. Matthew and Austin both mentioned empiricism. I assume from their backgrounds though, they were referring to different forms of empiricism (please correct me if I’m wrong). In Matthew’s case, being an empiricist as a scientist generally means knowledge is constrained by data and by what can be demonstrated through repeatable observation or experimentation. Austin’s use of the word seems more in line with empiricism as it’s often practiced in political science, relying on historical records, primary sources, and artifacts to understand past events.
While those methods can be incredibly helpful and informative, both have their limitations and seem unequipped to make judgments about what is “good” or “bad” or other normative value claims. I'm thinking back to David Hume’s “is-ought” problem, which distinguishes descriptive statements about “what is” from prescriptive statements about “what ought to be,” and holds the latter cannot logically be derived from the former.
With that in mind, and the recognition that empiricism can inform our thinking up to a point and is limited to establishing facts, which are valuable in their own right, what other methods are or should be employed in nuclear policy to justify conclusions about what “should” exist and what policies we “should” support to achieve those outcomes?
Second, regarding instability, isn’t it the case that some periods of episodic instability have coincided with heightened shared fears and mutual anxiety that, in turn, created political space for subsequent improvements? Arms racing in the 60s for example, preceded SALT I and the ABM Treaty, the Euromissile Crisis led to the INF Treaty, and various accidents or near misses led to safety reforms. Correlation is not causation of course, but these episodes raise the question of whether instability can, under certain conditions that generate sufficient concern and urgency among the public and policymakers, act as a catalyst that enables systemic reform and end results that are often regarded as “good.”
I’m not suggesting instability should be promoted or manufactured as a means to achieve an end; but I am somewhat skeptical whether an equilibrium of the sort Matthew describes “in which nuclear-related pressures and forces balance to zero, and neither side sees need for significant changes” would encourage or motivate further reductions, which for those who view strategic instability as inherently “bad” would presumably constitute a “good” outcome.
I have some more thoughts on Matthew’s piece, but since I’ve already overstayed my welcome in this comment section, I’ll save those for another day – and for a second comment on his post. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts!
Hi guys, thanks for a great discussion. I thought the questioning of baseline premises and assumptions was incredibly useful and thought-provoking, and I wanted to ask a couple of follow-ups:
First, in addition to revisiting terminology, I’d be interested to hear your expanded thoughts on methodology. Matthew and Austin both mentioned empiricism. I assume from their backgrounds though, they were referring to different forms of empiricism (please correct me if I’m wrong). In Matthew’s case, being an empiricist as a scientist generally means knowledge is constrained by data and by what can be demonstrated through repeatable observation or experimentation. Austin’s use of the word seems more in line with empiricism as it’s often practiced in political science, relying on historical records, primary sources, and artifacts to understand past events.
While those methods can be incredibly helpful and informative, both have their limitations and seem unequipped to make judgments about what is “good” or “bad” or other normative value claims. I'm thinking back to David Hume’s “is-ought” problem, which distinguishes descriptive statements about “what is” from prescriptive statements about “what ought to be,” and holds the latter cannot logically be derived from the former.
With that in mind, and the recognition that empiricism can inform our thinking up to a point and is limited to establishing facts, which are valuable in their own right, what other methods are or should be employed in nuclear policy to justify conclusions about what “should” exist and what policies we “should” support to achieve those outcomes?
Second, regarding instability, isn’t it the case that some periods of episodic instability have coincided with heightened shared fears and mutual anxiety that, in turn, created political space for subsequent improvements? Arms racing in the 60s for example, preceded SALT I and the ABM Treaty, the Euromissile Crisis led to the INF Treaty, and various accidents or near misses led to safety reforms. Correlation is not causation of course, but these episodes raise the question of whether instability can, under certain conditions that generate sufficient concern and urgency among the public and policymakers, act as a catalyst that enables systemic reform and end results that are often regarded as “good.”
I’m not suggesting instability should be promoted or manufactured as a means to achieve an end; but I am somewhat skeptical whether an equilibrium of the sort Matthew describes “in which nuclear-related pressures and forces balance to zero, and neither side sees need for significant changes” would encourage or motivate further reductions, which for those who view strategic instability as inherently “bad” would presumably constitute a “good” outcome.
I have some more thoughts on Matthew’s piece, but since I’ve already overstayed my welcome in this comment section, I’ll save those for another day – and for a second comment on his post. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts!