Thank you for this Substack--there are so few readily-available spaces to have serious discussions about nuclear strategy.
I've been meaning to comment on one of your many articles for awhile now. I'm a former USAF intel officer who spent part of his career working with STRATCOM, though I was never permanently assigned. I'm now pursuing a new masters in a totally different field (social work to become a therapist--there's got to be a good joke in this somewhere!) but retain a lifelong interest in all things nuclear, as well as "big picture" grand strategy.
This was a great series--I was especially grateful you got Ms. Gottemoeller on the pod. Quick question: when it comes to the post-START world & the potential for a new arms control agreement... do we now have to talk about Europe (and perhaps Japan) in a new way, just as we now have to talk about China's role in our strategy in a way we've not really ever had to? I don't think it's hyperbole to say that -- because of fears of our unreliability -- there is now a genuine, *actual* possibility (even if small) of German, Polish, or pan-European (or Japanese) nuclear arsenals. In other words, I ask this not to get into hypotheticals about the strategic landscape broadly -- or to get into ideological discussions about the second Trump term --but, for now, specifically in the context of future arms control. And again, to be clear, the possibility of these countries going nuclear (and thus effectively ending the NPT regime) is likely low, but it is now at least an *actual* possibility.
Is that too much of a stretch? I apologize if you addressed this point in detail in the podcasts, I know you certainly did take into account global ramifications of Pres Trump's fundamentally different worldview. It's been a busy few months! -- Thank you, Adam
Thank you for this Substack--there are so few readily-available spaces to have serious discussions about nuclear strategy.
I've been meaning to comment on one of your many articles for awhile now. I'm a former USAF intel officer who spent part of his career working with STRATCOM, though I was never permanently assigned. I'm now pursuing a new masters in a totally different field (social work to become a therapist--there's got to be a good joke in this somewhere!) but retain a lifelong interest in all things nuclear, as well as "big picture" grand strategy.
This was a great series--I was especially grateful you got Ms. Gottemoeller on the pod. Quick question: when it comes to the post-START world & the potential for a new arms control agreement... do we now have to talk about Europe (and perhaps Japan) in a new way, just as we now have to talk about China's role in our strategy in a way we've not really ever had to? I don't think it's hyperbole to say that -- because of fears of our unreliability -- there is now a genuine, *actual* possibility (even if small) of German, Polish, or pan-European (or Japanese) nuclear arsenals. In other words, I ask this not to get into hypotheticals about the strategic landscape broadly -- or to get into ideological discussions about the second Trump term --but, for now, specifically in the context of future arms control. And again, to be clear, the possibility of these countries going nuclear (and thus effectively ending the NPT regime) is likely low, but it is now at least an *actual* possibility.
Is that too much of a stretch? I apologize if you addressed this point in detail in the podcasts, I know you certainly did take into account global ramifications of Pres Trump's fundamentally different worldview. It's been a busy few months! -- Thank you, Adam