Messages from Moscow

Reading Russia's NPT Report

Reading Russia’s NPT National Report:

The 2026 NPT Review Conference begins in New York on April 27. The NPT Parties will gather, share their views on how treaty implementation is going, and attempt to gather consensus around whatever consensus can be gathered around. The general view is that the conference is not primed for success on anything substantive, or maybe anything at all.

As the NPT parties prepare for the conference, dozens have submitted national reports on their implementation and working papers on various aspects of the treaty. The documents contain useful information on how the various parties will approach the conference; I was particularly interested to read Russia’s lengthy report, and wanted to share some quick takes.

The Russian document answers the 2010 NPT Review Conference (the last one to reach consensus), which called on all NPT parties to submit national reports, and in particular for the five nuclear weapon states to report on their actions in pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Of the latter, the UK also submitted a national report this spring, and France submitted a report at last year’s Preparatory Committee meeting; China and the United States have not yet done so.

Much of the report repeats existing Russian policy documents like the 2021 Russian National Security Strategy, the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, and the 2024 Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. Anchoring to these documents isn’t unexpected but does suggest other parties should keep them in mind as they try to understand where alignment may be possible.

I took away positive news on AI and nuclear decision-making; bad news on transparency as a RevCon area of agreement; and unsurprising but important Russian narratives on nuclear sharing and nuclear disarmament.

AI and Nuclear Decision-Making

Russia’s paper includes a line that I haven’t seen elsewhere:

The Military Doctrine and the Basic Principles of State Policy clearly state that the decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation.

Overall, the Russian Federation ensures decisive human involvement and judgment in the field of nuclear weapons on an ongoing basis, including strict control at the level of the country’s highest military and political leadership. Against the backdrop of technological progress, this approach remains an absolute constant.

The United States, France, and the UK made a similar statement in 2022, and China and the United States did so in 2024. Russia, to my knowledge, has not previously done so. This is encouraging, not only because the alternative is deeply troubling, but also in NPT terms, because this issue is one that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and Brazil call for in their own working papers. Mexico sponsored a resolution on this topic at last fall’s General Assembly, which passed despite opposition from Russia and the other nuclear weapon states. If Russia is now willing to entertain language on this topic, of clear interest to NPT parties, this may now be an area of potential alignment. I hope so.

NPT Transparency

The issue of transparency in the NPT context is a major focus for the conference; the EU, Ireland-New Zealand-Switzerland, the NAC, the NPDI, and the United States have all submitted RevCon papers related to process enhancements by which states submit reports regarding their implementation of the NPT and then engage in dialogue regarding those reports, and parties met in 2023 in a working group focused in part on this subject.

Russia’s report is in itself a positive step. The fact of its report will be contrasted with the lack (as of now) of a U.S. report. Moreover, the Russian report includes detailed numbers relating to its nuclear arsenal, again differentiating from the lack of any new U.S. numbers, which have not been released since 2024, and France’s recent decision to no longer provide even a ceiling for its arsenal size. It’s worth noting that Russia’s numbers are as of 2022 and thus not new. China, of course, has submitted neither a report nor numbers.

Russia’s transparency is tempered by its narrative. Russia

“does not view transparency in terms of absolute values or universally applicable templates” and “is convinced that automatically increasing transparency is not a definitive or fail-safe way to reduce strategic risks. Moreover, an ill-considered policy in this area could lead to the opposite outcome.”

I wrote elsewhere that integrating a more robust process for transparency within the NPT could well be one area on which NPT parties can agree this year, and thus a rare opportunity for a conference that leaves the NPT stronger rather than weaker. Russia’s paper may indicate that Russia is unlikely to join such an effort. This is a shame.

Nuclear Sharing

While proclaiming the “centralization of nuclear weapons command and control” in the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, Russia goes beyond the extensively quoted 2024 “Foundations” document. In the NPT report, Russia explains that “control over Russian nuclear weapons is centralized in all cases and on a permanent basis and is not transferred to anyone…This ensures strict compliance with the relevant obligations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus under articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

This new language is a necessary rejoinder to those who have questioned the consistency of Russia’s deployments to Belarus and its NPT obligations to not “transfer” nuclear weapons to any state. Russia has denied any transfer, but statements by President Lukashenka of Belarus have been in some tension with this claim. The Russian report seeks to put this question to rest, albeit via assertion rather than explanation.

Having done so, the report proceeds to attack the policies of other nuclear alliances. Included in a longer list of factors negatively impacting strategic stability:

- “Intensive and extensive development within the North Atlantic bloc, which has proclaimed itself a “nuclear alliance”, of schemes and means for “nuclear sharing” - with the broad participation of non-nuclear member States and reliance on the advanced deployment of United States nuclear weapons at a growing number of sites in Europe;

- “The inclusion of elements of NATO nuclear sharing in United States ‘extended deterrence’ arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, with a tendency towards establishing a tripartite “nuclear alliance” between the United States, South Korea and Japan;

- “A radical deepening of coordination among European nuclear States on military nuclear policy issues, including planning for the use of nuclear weapons and joint operations, against the backdrop of discussions with anti-Russian rhetoric on the establishment of a common European nuclear capability to supplement the nuclear umbrella of the United States;”

Putting aside the hypocrisy of criticizing NATO while implementing similar policies in Belarus, the first bullet’s critique is by now familiar. Noteworthy is the emphasis on the “growing number” of forward-basing sites (presumably referring to UK announcements in 2025) and “broad participation” of non-nuclear weapon states in the “schemes and means” for sharing. I expect Russia to invoke at the Review Conference legalistic and technical arguments that NATO’s policies are inconsistent with NPT obligations but its actions in Belarus are not, essentially by suggesting a greater and more concerning involvement of non-nuclear weapon states in the former.

Russia has pressed similar accusations for a decade, with heavy assistance more recently from China. More concerning is that other states are picking up the argument. In a Review Conference working paper, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) expressed “concern over policies and practices that run contrary to the principles and objectives of the Treaty such as the continued and evolving nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and extended deterrence,” calling those policies a new nuclear arms race and a clear violation of the treaty. Brazilechoes the allegation that “nuclear sharing arrangements” are inconsistent with NPT obligations, and further repeats Russia’s allegation that new nuclear umbrellas are being created. In one of Iran’s five (!) working papers for this conference, it goes further, accusing U.S. nuclear policy and “nuclear sharing” in particular of constituting proliferation.

NATO Allies, in many cases strong proponents of both the NPT and progress towards nuclear disarmament and with relevant domestic constituencies of their own, must react carefully to these potentially damaging (and untrue) accusations. Coordinated by the superb NATO International Staff, I expect Allies will be ready to push back and respond at the NPT meeting as necessary. But changes to that argumentation may be needed.

Past Allied messaging emphasized the legality of NATO policies in language similar to Russia’s defense of Belarus (i.e., no “transfers,” maintenance of U.S. “control”). It has stressed the hypocrisy of Russia’s attacks, given that the Soviet Union was part of the effort to ensure the consistency of the NPT’s provisions with the already extant NATO policies, as brilliantly documented by William Alberque. While true, the latter argument is less useful with states like China and some in the Non-Aligned Movement, who weren’t present for those negotiations and can credibly claim to have not understood the NATO practice when they joined the NPT.

In 2026, Allies should engage (to an extent) in the more technical and legalistic argument invoked by Russia and China. Every Ally has an interest (and obligation!) to ensure there is no proliferation involved in the implementation of NATO policies. Where states have genuine questions (i.e., not Russia or China!), Allies should to the extent possible do more to explain how they ensure consistency, rather than simply asserting it. New Ally and long-time disarmament advocate Sweden would be a particularly strong messenger, having presumably recently assured itself of these facts.

At the same time, Allies should seek to contain this argument and redirect discussion to where it belongs. In the context of war in Iran tied to its nuclear program, Russian nuclear threats and new doomsday weapons, expiration of the last arms control treaty, and an unacknowledged nuclear build-up in China, it defies belief that a main focus of this Review Conference should be decades-old NATO policy. Allies should engage NAM members individually and outside of the NPT plenary hall to substantively answer any actual questions, but should also make clear that while Russia and China’s motivations for pursuing the nuclear sharing issue are obvious, it is less clear why others would see this as a priority.

Returning to Russia’s paper, the point on the expansion of new nuclear sharing arrangements in East Asia is patently and demonstrably false. The ROK and Japan have been strong and capable partners in pushing back on such false claims in the past; unfortunately efforts will need to be expanded both in statements and in direct diplomacy to confront this ridiculous claim. The relationship between nonproliferation and security assurances is quite familiar to Non-Aligned states.

I read Russia’s third point above as a reference to France’s recent announcement of “forward deterrence.” We discussed President Macron’s announcement in detail separately. Macron explained that, like NATO’s arrangements, the implementation of his “forward deterrence” will be fully NPT-compliant. But between the newness of this announcement and many open questions about its implementation, there is opportunity for those aiming to confuse and distract at the Review Conference. France and its partners will need to be prepared to explain and defend this new angle of “nuclear sharing,” and to differentiate it from NATO policies.

Narrative on Arms Control and Risk Reduction

Notable – but not novel – in Russia’s report is the lengths to which it goes to establish Russia as the responsible actor that has made self-proclaimed “truly impressive contributions” to arms control and disarmament, while painting the United States as a destructive actor unwilling to cooperate. Treaty by treaty, history is rewritten to emphasize unmotivated U.S. withdrawals, while Russia nobly proposed extensions (New START) or moratoria (INF) with no response. No mention is made of Russia’s serial noncompliance with these agreements, and forgotten is Russia’s past refusal to engage on arms control absent favorable resolution of the Ukraine issue. Russia will of course seek to revise history to its advantage, and the U.S. and other delegations will and should push back to correct the record. In doing so, they would be wise to adjust the U.S. narrative surrounding the February expiration of New START. That narrative placed too much emphasis on the inadequacies of the expired treaty, and too little on the emptiness of the Russian offer to “extend” New START in view of Russia’s sustained refusal to implement its verification measures or engage on a follow-on. New START was broadly appreciated as a contribution by the United States and Russia to the disarmament objectives of the NPT. U.S. NPT objectives will be best furthered not by criticizing the treaty but by explaining clearly that Russian and Chinese actions have regrettably prevented its continued implementation.

Russia’s efforts to engage in a blame game on arms control are intended to obscure its clear view that its NPT Article VI obligations come with preconditions that haven’t been met. Nuclear disarmament can only be considered in the context of efforts towards “general and complete disarmament,” and cannot be isolated from the “overall military, political, and strategic context.” Russia asserts the “feasibility” of nuclear disarmament ideas and proposals must be considered in the context of the international security context, immediately concluding that in Russian eyes all such proposals fail that test. Russia is clear: the “conditions” for disarmament (unstated, but potentially to include the abandonment of Ukraine?) have not been met.

This view contradicts the position of the New Agenda Coalition, a group of influential and pro-disarmament states, who in their working paper reject “arguments purporting that nuclear disarmament can advance only when undefined security circumstances improve… We cannot and must not wait for a speculative state of ‘strategic stability’ to make progress.” It is equally inconsistent with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, who in their paper reject “any proposals that would subject [disarmament] obligations and previously agreed commitments to preconditions on the pretext of political and security factors.” U.S. and other diplomats should help other Review Conference participants recognize this inconsistency, ensuring that it is not drowned out by an argument about who is responsible for the demise of past arms control treaties.

Unfortunately, Russia’s paper applies similar conditions on steps to reduce nuclear risks, a popular topic this year (e.g., in the NAC paper and also a paper from this broad group). Russia views such measures as necessarily conjoined with the international security environment, and at present incapable of delivering results or adding value. Russia makes clear it will not engage in such risk reduction measures via the group of nuclear weapon states. That said, the Russian paper does then walk through a list of measures it will continue to implement, including notifications, communications lines, non-targeting, and conventions on the prevention of nuclear war, acknowledging the value of transparency and confidence building measures. I hope that China will read this list with close attention, and that NPT parties will push for more on this front.

Conclusion

Russia’s paper plays the role that a national report to the NPT should: it characterizes Russia’s views of the treaty and its implementation, and offers a Russian perspective on its own performance. Unsurprisingly, Russia gives itself good marks on that implementation, in particular with regard to disarmament. The paper distorts and omits in many areas, giving clues as to how Russia will present itself during the Review Conference itself and making the case for a U.S. report to advance its own (more accurate) narrative on some of these topics. Russia’s statement on the role of AI in its nuclear weapons is interesting and hopefully indicates an area of potential alignment for the Review Conference. While the report demonstrates the value that an interactive dialogue on such reports could have, unfortunately Russia seems disinclined to go along with efforts to incorporate such a dialogue into the Conference’s procedures. Hopefully that will change, and discussion on reports like this one can move forward over the course of the Review Conference.